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Abstract
We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the R-Multi-Bribery problem,
the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the perturbed
election under the voting rule R. Voters assign prices for withdrawing their vote, for swapping the
positions of two consecutive candidates in their preference order, and for perturbing their approval count
to favour candidates.
As our main result, we show that R-Multi-Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by
the number of candidates for many natural voting rules R, including Kemeny rule, all scoring protocols,
maximin rule, Bucklin rule, fallback rule, SP-AV, and any C1 rule. In particular, our result resolves the
parameterized complexity of R-Swap Bribery for all those voting rules, thereby solving a long-standing
open problem and “Challenge #2” of the “Nine Research Challenges in Computational Social Choice”
by Bredereck et al.
Further, our algorithm runs in single-exponential time for arbitrary cost; it thus improves the earlier
double-exponential time algorithm by Dorn and Schlotter that is restricted to the uniform-cost case for
all scoring protocols, the maximin rule, and Bucklin rule.
1 Introduction
In this work we address algorithmic problems from the area of voting and bribing. In these problems, we
are given as input an election, which consists of a set C of candidates and a set V of voters v, each of which
is equipped with a partial order v indicating their preferences over (subsets of) the candidates. Further,
we have a fixed voting rule R (that is not part of the input), which determines how the orders of the voters
are aggregated to determine the winner(s) of the election among the candidates. Popular examples of voting
rules R include “scoring protocols” like plurality—where the candidate(s) ranked first by a majority of voters
win(s)—or the Borda rule, where each candidate receives |C| − i points from being ranked i-th by a voter
and the candidate with most points wins; and the Copeland rule, which orders candidates by their number
of pairwise victories minus their number of pairwise defeats.
The goal is to perturb the given election (C, V ) by bribing voters through bribery actions Γ in such a
way that a designated candidate c? ∈ C wins the perturbed election (C, V )Γ under the voting rule R. Such
perturbation problems model various real-life issues, such as actual bribery, campaign management, or post-
election checks, as in destructive bribery (known as margin of victory); for an overview of the many flavours
of bribery problems we refer to a recent survey by Faliszewski and Rothe [25].
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R-Multi-Bribery Perturbation is performed by the actions of swapping the position of two adjacent
candidates in the preference order of some voter, by push actions that perturb the approval count of a
voter, and control changes that (de)activate some voters. The algorithmic problem is to achieve the goal by
performing the most cost-efficient actions. To measure cost of swaps, we consider the model introduced by
Elkind et al. [16] where each voter may assign different prices σv(c, c′) for swapping two consecutive candidates
c, c′ in their preference order; this captures the notion of small changes and comprises the preferences of the
voters. If voter v is involved in a swap or push action, a one-time influence cost ιv occurs. We additionally
allow voter-individual cost piv for push actions, and voter-individual cost αv and δv for activation and
deactivation. Our model is general enough that we even allow negative cost. We implicitly allow preference
orders to be partial, in particular we allow top-truncated orders, where voters rank only their top candidates
and are indifferent towards the other candidates (see Sect. 2). We call this very general set-up the R-Multi-
Bribery problem.
Various special cases of the R-Multi-Bribery problem have been studied in the literature; see Table 2
for an overview of which problems are captured by R-Multi-Bribery:
problem name specialization of R-Multi-Bribery
R-$Bribery σv ≡ 0, piv ≡ ∞, αv ≡ δv ≡ ∞
R-Manipulation ιv ≡ 0 for v ∈ S, ιv ≡ ∞ for v /∈M
R-CCAV/R-CCDV ιv ≡ 0, σv ≡ piv ≡ ∞
R-Swap Bribery piv ≡ ∞, αv ≡ δv ≡ ∞, ιv ≡ 0
R-Shift Bribery R-Swap Bribery with σv(c, c′) =∞ for c? /∈ {c, c′}
R-Support Brib. σv ≡ αv ≡ δv ≡ ∞, ιv ≡ 0
R-Mixed Bribery αv ≡ δv ≡ ∞, ιv ≡ 0
R-Extension Bribery σv(c, c′) = 0 if c, c′ unranked, else σv(c, c′) =∞; αv ≡ δv ≡ ∞, ιv = 0
R-Possible Winner reduce to R-Swap Bribery [16, Thm. 2]
Dodgson Score Condorcet-Swap Bribery with σv ≡ 1
Young Score Condorcet-CCDV with δv ≡ 1
Table 1: R-Multi-Bribery generalizes several studied bribery problems, whose formal definitions we give
in Appendix A.
For instance, in the R-Swap Bribery problem, only swaps are permitted. On the other hand, in the
R-Support Bribery problem, only push actions are allowed. And in the Young Score problem, only
control changes are allowed.
The aforementioned many special cases of R-Multi-Bribery have been investigated extensively from
an algorithmic viewpoint. As it turns out, most of the cases looked at are NP, such as e.g. R-Swap
Bribery. Therefore, we expect algorithms solving these problem exactly to take superpolynomial time
(assuming P 6= NP). Yet, in many application scenarios it is reasonable to assume that the number |C|
of candidates is small; it has therefore been of high interest to design algorithms for NP-hard voting and
bribery problem that exploit this property. In particular, a quest for algorithms which solve instances I of
size n in time f(|C|) · nO(1) for some function f has been made; such algorithms are called fixed-parameter
algorithms. Fixed-parameter algorithms are contrasted with so-called XP-algorithms which have run times of
the form nf(|C|). Whereas XP-algorithms are generally considered impractical even for small instances I and
few candidates, fixed-parameter algorithms have the potential to be practical, provided that the function f
exhibits moderate growth.
The current situation for voting and bribing problems is that indeed, a large number of fixed-parameter
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algorithms for NP-hard voting and bribing problems parameterized by |C| have been designed, for a multitude
of voting rules [1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 22]. For instance, a fundamental algorithm in that direction
is due to Dorn and Schlotter [15], who show how to solve R-Swap Bribery with uniform costs1 in time
22
O(|C|) ·nO(1) for all so-called linearly describable voting rulesR; here, uniform costs means that swapping any
two candidates always has the same cost for all voters. In the Dorn-Schlotter algorithm, as well as several
other fixed-parameter algorithms designed for few candidates, the function f(|C|) grows quite fast, often
double-exponential in |C|, which a priori makes these algorithms impractical even for very few candidates.
As the double-exponential dependence on |C| in those algorithms often stems from solving, as a subroutine,
a certain integer linear program (ILP) by means of a deep result of Lenstra [33], Bredereck et al. [7] put
forward the following “Challenge #1”, as part of their “Nine Research Challenges in Computational Social
Choice”:
Many [FPT results in computational social choice] rely on a deep result from combinatorial op-
timization due to Lenstra [that] is mainly of theoretical interest; this may render corresponding
fixed-parameter tractability results to be of classification nature only. Can the mentioned ILP-
based [...] results be replaced by direct combinatorial [...] fixed-parameter algorithms?
Another downside of the “ILP-based approach” is that it inherently treats voters not as individuals, but
as groups which share preferences. This makes it difficult to obtain algorithms where voters from the same
group differ in some way, such as by the cost of bribing them. Their “Challenge #2” thus reads:
[T]here is a huge difference between [...] problems, where each voter has unit cost for being bribed,
and the other flavors of bribery, where each voter has individually specified price [...] and it is
not known if they are in FPT or hard for W[1]. What is the exact parameterized complexity of the
R-Swap Bribery and R-Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of candidates, for each
voting rule R?
1.1 Our Contribution
Our main result is a fixed-parameter algorithm for R-Multi-Bribery parameterized by the number of
candidates, for many fundamental voting rules R. Our algorithm has a few advantages over previous works,
in that it works for voter-dependent cost functions, and it runs in time that is only single-exponential in |C|.
The algorithm applies to a large number of voting rules R, such as all natural scoring protocols where each
candidate receives at most |C| points from each voter.
Theorem 1. R-Multi-Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of candidates,
and can be solved in time
• 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n3 when R is any natural scoring protocol, any C1 rule, or SP-AV,
• 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n4 when R is the maximin, Bucklin or fallback rule, and
• 2O(|C|!6 log |C|) · n3 when R is the Kemeny rule.
In summary, our algorithm subsumes, and improves, all previously devised algorithms for the problems
listed in Table 1. For some problems, such as Young Sore, our algorithm yields the first improvement
since 1977; we summarize the comparison in Table 2.
Applications of Theorem 1. We argued that R-Multi-Bribery generalizes many well-studied voting
and bribing problems, parameterized by the number of candidates. A direct corollary of Theorem 1 is:
Corollary 2. Let R be any natural scoring protocol, a C1 rule, the maximin rule, the Bucklin rule, the SP-AV
rule, the fallback rule, or Kemeny rule. Then R-Swap Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized
by the number |C| of candidates.
1Bredereck et al. [8] pointed out that the algorithm by Dorn and Schlotter only works for uniform costs.
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previous best result new result
problem run time / hardness voting rules R
R-$Bribery 22O(|C|)nO(1) Approval [10] 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n3
R-Manipulation 22O(|C|)nO(1) Borda [5] 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n3
R-CCAV/R-CCDV 22O(|C|)nO(1) Approval [10] 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n3
R-Swap Bribery 22O(|C|)nO(1), uniform cost Approval [15] 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n3
R-Shift Bribery XP-algor., arbitrary cost, Borda, Cope-
FPT-AS, restricted cost land, Maximin [11] 2O(|C|
6 log |C|) · n4
R-Support Brib. NP-hard Fallback, SP-AV [36] 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n4
R-Mixed Bribery NP-hard SP-AV [16] 2O(|C|6 log |C|) · n3
R-Extension Bribery NP-hard Borda, Cope-
land0, Maximin [2] 2O(|C|
6 log |C|) · n4
R-Possible Winner 22O(|C|)nO(1) Bucklin, Copeland,
pos. scoring protocols [4] 2O(|C|
6 log |C|) · n3
Dodgson Score 22
O(|C|)
nO(1) [1] 2O(|C|
6 log |C|) · n3
Young Score 22
O(|C|)
nO(1) [37] 2O(|C|
6 log |C|) · n3
Table 2: Summary of results from this paper for R-Multi-Bribery compared to previous works for special
cases. In each row corresponding to a problem R-Problem, we state the previous best known dependency
on |C| for voting rules R for which R-Problem is known to be NP-hard. For R being the Kemeny rule, no
previous results are known to us. For R-Shift Bribery, FPT-AS refers to a fixed-parameter approximation
scheme which is an algorithm that yields a (1− ε)-approximate solution in time f(1/ε, |C|) · nO(1) for some
superpolynomial function f and any ε > 0; it is thus a weaker result than a fixed-parameter algorithm.
This solves “Challenge #2” by Bredereck et al. [7]. In particular, for scoring protocols, maximin rule and
Bucklin rule, Corollary 2 extends and improves an algorithm by Dorn and Schlotter [15] that is restricted to
the uniform cost case of R-Swap Bribery, and requires double-exponential run time 22O(|C|) · nO(1).
We remark that it is unclear (cf. [22, p. 338]) if the Kemeny rule can be described by linear inequalities
as defined by Dorn and Schlotter [15]; even if it does, ours is the first fixed-parameter algorithm for R-Swap
Bribery under the Kemeny rule, as Dorn and Schlotter’s algorithm only applies to the unit-cost case.
Another corollary of Theorem 1 is the following:
Corollary 3. R-Shift Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of candidates,
for R being the Borda rule, the maximin rule and the Copelandα rule.
This way, we simultaneously improve the fixed-parameter algorithm by Dorn and Schlotter [15] for uni-
form cost, the XP-algorithm and the fixed-parameter approximation scheme for arbitrary cost by Bredereck
et al. [8].
Further, we have the following:
Corollary 4. Approval-$Bribery, Approval-$CCAV and Approval-$CCDV can be solved in time
2O(|C|
6 log |C|) · n4.
This improves a recent result by Bredereck et al. [10] who solved these problems in time that is double-
exponential in |C|.
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1.2 Our Approach
The run times that we achieve in Theorem 1 are (except for the Kemeny rule) only single-exponential in
|C|. To achieve this, we avoid using Lenstra’s algorithm for solving fixed-dimension ILPs [33], which was the
method of choice so far (and which led to double-exponential run times). Typically, when using Lenstra’s
algorithm one has to “group objects” in order to be able to bound their number in terms of the used
parameters. Instead, we formulate the R-Multi-Bribery problem in terms of an n-fold integer program
(IP). Unlike fixed-dimension ILPs, n-fold IPs allow variable dimension at the expense of a more rigid block
structure of the constraint matrix. We manage to encode the R-Multi-Bribery problem for many voting
rules R in a constraint matrix that has this required structure. The formulations are not straightforward:
rather, we model the problems in terms of an “extended” n-fold IP which has a more general format than is
required by the “standard” n-fold IP discussed in the literature. Then we show how to efficiently transform
any extended n-fold IP into a standard n-fold IP. The dimension of this IP is not bounded by any function
of the number |C| of candidates; however, we bound the dimension of each block by a polynomial in |C|.
Then we solve the standard n-fold IP via an algorithm of Hemmecke et al. [28] whose runtime depends
exponentially only on the largest dimension of each of its blocks. That algorithm has a rather combinatorial
flavour by traversing the problem’s “Graver bases”; cf. Hemmecke et al. [28]. This way, we substantially
contribute towards resolving “Challenge #1” by Bredereck et al. [7].
1.3 Related Work
Bribery problems in voting systems are well-studied [8, 15, 16, 22]. Bredereck et al. [8] consider shift bribery,
where candidates can be shifted up a number of positions in a voter’s preference order; this is a special
case of swap bribery. An extension of their model [12] allows campaign managers to affect the position of
the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action, which
applies to large-scale campaigns. In a different model [11], complexity of bribery of elections admitting for
multiple winners, such as when committees are formed, has been studied. Also, different cost models have
been considered: Faliszewski et al. [21] require that each voter has their own price that is independent of
the changes made to the bribed vote. The more general models of Faliszewski [19] and Faliszewski et al. [23]
allow for prices that depend on the amount of change the voter is asked for by the briber. For various other
bribery models that have been investigated algorithmically, cf. Rothe [3, Chapter 4.3.5].
Regarding ILPs, tractable fragments include ILPs whose defining matrix is totally unimodular (due to the
integrality of the corresponding polyhedra and the polynomiality of linear programming), and ILPs in fixed
dimension (due to the algorithms of Lenstra [33] and Kannan [30]). Courcelle’s theorem [14] implies that
solving ILPs is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the treewidth of the constraint matrix and the
maximum domain size of the variables. Ganian and Ordyniak [27] showed fixed-parameter tractability for the
combined parameter the treedepth and the largest absolute value in the constraint matrix, and contrasted
this with a W[1]-hardness result when treedepth is exchanged for treewidth. Recently, further combinatorial
algorithms for special cases of n-fold IPs and related tree-fold IPs have been suggested [13, 31].
Organization. In Sect. 2 we provide the necessary background on the problems that we solve. Then in
Sect. 3 we define extended n-fold IPs, which later allows for easier problem modeling. We do so in Sect. 4,
where we give extended n-fold IP formulations for several instantiations of the R-Multi-Bribery problem.
The complexity lower bounds and hardness results are given in Sect. 5. We conclude in Sect. 6.
2 Voting and Bribing Problems
We give notions for the problems we deal with; for background, we refer to the surveys of Brams and
Fishburn [6], and Faliszewski and Rothe [25].
Elections. An election (C, V ) consists of a set C of candidates and a set V of voters, who indicate their
preferences over the candidates in C. There are many ways in which a voter’s preferences can be modeled;
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throughout this paper we use a variant of the ordinal model, where each voter v’s preferences are represented
via a preference order v which is a partial order over C. We explicitly allow partial orders; we call an
election complete if all voters’ preference orders are linear orders. In some problems we study voters who
indicate their preferences only for their “top candidates”; we model this with “truncated orders”. For an
integer t ∈ N, a preference order v is t-top-truncated if there is a permutation pi over {1, . . . , |C|} such that
v is of the form cpi(1) v · · · v cpi(t) v
{
cpi(t+1), . . . , cpi(|C|)
}
; that is, v is indifferent among the members
of the set
{
cpi(t+1), . . . , cpi(|C|)
}
which we call unranked candidates; we refer to
{
cpi(1), . . . , cpi(t)
}
as to the
ranked candidates. For a ranked candidate c we denote by rank(c, v) their rank in v; then v’s most preferred
candidate has rank 1 and their least preferred candidate has rank |C|. Also, for t-top-truncated preference
orders v it holds that rank(c, v) ≤ t for all ranked candidates c ∈ C. If v is not a linear order (thus, v is
a quasiorder), we replace it with any linear extension of v and set the cost of swapping two candidates c, c′
to 0 whenever rank(c, v) = rank(c′, v) in the original order. Independently of voters, for the set of candidates
C we also refer to a linear order C over C as to a ranking of C (i.e., ranking is a shorthand for a linear
order on candidates). For distinct candidates c, c′ ∈ C, we write c v c′ if voter v prefers c over c′. To
simplify notation, we sometimes identify the candidate set C with the set {1, . . . , |C|}, in particular when
expressing permutations over C. All studied problems designate a candidate in C; we always denote it by c?.
We sometimes identify a voter v with their preference order v, as long as no confusion arises.
Next, we describe the actions by which we perturb a given election (C, V ). Applying a set Γ of actions to
(C, V ) yields a perturbed election that we denote by (C, V )Γ. Performing an action incurs a cost; we specify
these costs by functions that for each voter specify their individual cost of performing the action.
Swaps. Let (C, V ) be an election and let v∈ V be a voter. For candidates c, c′ ∈ C, a swap s = (c, c′)v
means to exchange the positions of c and c′ in v; denote the perturbed order by sv. A swap (c, c′)v is
admissible in v if rank(c, v) = rank(c′, v)− 1. A set S of swaps is admissible in v if they can be applied
sequentially in v, one after the other, in some order, such that each one of them is admissible. Note that
the perturbed vote, denoted by Sv , is independent from the order in which the swaps of S are applied. We
also extend this notation for applying swaps in several votes and denote it V S . We specify v’s cost of swaps
by a function σv : C × C → Z. A special case of swaps are “shifts”, where we want to make c? win the
perturbed election by shifting them forward in some of the votes, at an appropriate cost, without exceeding
a given budget. Shifts can be modelled by swaps only involving c?.
Push actions. Let (C, V ) be an election. In certain voting rules, such as SP-AV or Fallback, each voter
v ∈ V additionally has an approval count av ∈ {0, . . . , |C|}. Voter v’s approval count2 av indicates that they
approve the top-ranked av many candidates in their preferences order, and disapprove all others. A “push
action” can change a voter’s approval count: formally, for voter v∈ V and t ∈ {−av, . . . , |C| − av}, a push
action pv = t means to change their approval count to av + t. We specify the cost of push actions by a
function piv : {−av, . . . , |C| − av} → Z; we stipulate that piv(0) = 0.
If voter v is involved in a swap or push action, a one-time influence cost ιv occurs.
Control changes. Let (C, V ) be an election. We partition the set V into a set Va of active voters and a
set V` of latent voters. Only active voters participate in an election, but through a “control change” latent
voters can become active or active voters can become latent. (If no partition of V into Va and V` is specified,
then we implicitly assume that V = Va.)
Formally, a control change γ activates some latent voters from V` and deactivates some active voters
from Va; denote the changed set of voters by (V` ∪Va)γ . We denote the cost of activating voter v ∈ V` by αv
and the cost of deactivating voter v ∈ Va by δv.
Voting rules. A voting rule R is a function that maps an election (C, V ) to a subset W ⊆ C, called the
winners. We study the following voting rules:
Scoring protocols. A scoring protocol is defined through a vector s = (s1, . . . , s|C|) of integers with
s1 ≥ . . . ≥ s|C| ≥ 0. For each position p ∈ {1, . . . , |C|}, value sp specifies the number of points that each
candidate c receives from each voter that ranks c as jth best. Any candidate with the maximum number
2See Scoring protocols for the definition.
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of points is a winner. Examples of scoring protocols include the Plurality rule with s = (1, 0, . . . , 0), the
d-Approval rule with s = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with d ones, and the Borda rule with s = (|C| − 1, |C| −
2, . . . , 1, 0). Throughout, we consider only natural scoring protocols for which s1 ≤ |C|; this is the case for
the aforementioned popular rules.
Bucklin. The Bucklin winning round is the (unique) number k such that using the k-approval rule yields
a candidate with more than n2 points, but the (k− 1)-approval rule does not. A Bucklin winner is then any
candidate with the maximum points (over all candidates) when the k-approval rule is applied.
Condorcet-consistent rules. A candidate c ∈ C is a Condorcet winner if any other c′ ∈ C \ {c} satisfies
|{v∈ V | c v c′}| > |{v ∈ V | c′ v c}|. A voting rule is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the Condorcet
winner in case there is one. Fishburn [26] classified all Condorcet-consistent rules as C1, C2 or C3, depending
on the kind of information needed to determine the winner. For candidates c, c′ ∈ C let v(c, c′) be the number
of voters who prefer c over c′, that is, v(c, c′) = |{v∈ V | c v c′}|; we write c <M c′ if c beats c′ in a
head-to-head contest, that is, if v(c, c′) > v(c′, c).
C1: R is C1 if knowing <M suffices to determine the winner, that is, for each pair of candidates c, c′ we
know whether v(c, c′) > v(c′, c), v(c, c′) < v(c′, c) or v(c, c′) = v(c′, c). An example is the Copelandα
rule for α ∈ [0, 1], which specifies that for each head-to-head contest between two distinct candidates, if
some candidate is preferred by a majority of voters then they obtain one point and the other candidate
obtains zero points, and if a tie occurs then both candidates obtain α points; the candidate with largest
sum of points wins.
C2: R is C2 if it is not C1 and knowing the exact value of v(c, c′) for all c, c′ ∈ C suffices to determine the
winner. Examples are the Maximin rule which declares any candidate c ∈ C a winner who maximizes
v∗(c) = min{v(c, c′) | c′ ∈ C \ {c}}; and the Kemeny rule which declares any candidate c ∈ C a winner
for whom there exists a ranking R of C that ranks c first and maximizes the total agreement with
voters ∑
v∈V
∣∣{(c, c′) | ((c R c′)⇔ (c v c′)) ∀c, c′ ∈ C}∣∣
among all rankings.
C3: R is C3 if it is neither C1 nor C2. Examples are the Dodgson rule which declares any candidate c ∈ C
a winner for whom a minimum number of swaps make them the Condorcet winner of the manipulated
election; and the Young rule which declares any candidate c ∈ C a winner for whom removing a
minimum number of voters from the election makes c the Condorcet winner of the perturbed election.
Additionally, if approval counts are given for each voter, other voting rules are possible:
SP-AV. Each candidate c receives a point from every voter v with rank(c, v) ≤ av. A candidate with
maximum number of points wins the election.
Fallback. Delete, for each voter v, their unranked candidates (i.e., all c with rank(c, v) > av) from its
order. Then, use the Bucklin rule, which might fail to determine a winner due to the deletion of unranked
candidates; in that case, use the SP-AV rule.
At this point we can formally define the R-Multi-Bribery problem:
R-Multi Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: A complete election (C, V ) with active voters Va, latent voters V` and approval counts a
v for
v ∈ V , a designated candidate c? ∈ C, and swap costs σv for v ∈ V , push action costs piv for
v ∈ V , activation costs αv for v ∈ V` and deactivation costs δv for v ∈ Va, and a one-time
influence cost ιv.
Task: Find a set S of admissible swaps, a set P of push actions, and a control change γ of minimum
cost so that c? wins the election
(
C,
(
((Va ∪ V`)γ)S
)P)
under rule R.
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3 Extended n-fold Integer Programming
In this section we discuss the class of n-fold IPs, and show how to enhance them to obtain “extended” n-fold
IPs.
3.1 n-fold integer programs
We begin by defining n-fold IPs. For background, we refer to the books of Onn [35] and De Loera et al. [34].
Let r, s, t, n be positive integers. Given nt-dimensional integer vectors w,b, l,u, an n-fold IP problem
(IP )E(n),w,b,l,u in variable dimension nt is defined as
min
{
wx | E(n)x = b , l ≤ x ≤ u , x ∈ Znt
}
, (1)
where
E(n) :=

D D · · · D
A 0 · · · 0
0 A · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · A

is an (r+ns)×nt-matrix, D ∈ Zr×t is an r× t-matrix and A ∈ Zs×t is an s× t-matrix. For numbers, vectors
and matrices, we denote by 〈•〉 the binary encoding length of an object.
Hemmecke et al. [28] developed a dynamic program to show the following:
Proposition 5 ([28, Thm. 6.2]). There is an algorithm that, given (IP )E(n),w,b,l,u, in time a
O(trs+t2s) ·
O(n3〈w,b, l,u〉) either
1. declares the program infeasible or unbounded or
2. finds a minimizer of it;
where a = max{‖D‖∞, ‖A‖∞}.
The structure of E(n) allows us to divide the nt variables into n bricks of size t. We use subscripts to
index within a brick and superscripts to denote the index of the brick, i.e., xij is the j-th variable of the i-th
brick with j ∈ {1, . . . , t} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3.2 Extended n-fold integer programs
We now introduce a class of IPs that we call extended n-fold IPs. Our motivation for this is to enhance
n-fold IPs with “integer programming tricks” that are well-known for general IPs; we want to show how
to implement them while preserving the structure of n-fold IPs. These tricks will make the application of
n-fold IPs more convenient; they include introducing inequalities using slack variables, implementing logical
connectives or the bool(·) operation.
That leads us to the following definition.
Definition 6. Let x =
(
x11, . . . , x
1
t , . . . , x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
t
)
be an nt-dimensional vector of integer variables. Let
B ∈ Z, (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Zn and a = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ Zt. We say that
n∑
i=1
t∑
j=1
ajx
i
j = B
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is a globally uniform constraint, and that
t∑
j=1
ajx
i
j = b
i, i = 1, . . . , n
is a locally uniform constraint. We call the respective left hand sides globally uniform expressions and locally
uniform expressions. We stress that the coefficients aj are the same regardless of the index i.
Observe that every n-fold IP consists of box constraints (i.e., lower and upper bounds represented by
vectors l and u), a weight vector w, and collections of globally and locally uniform constraints. From now
on we call the problem (1) an n-fold IP in standard form. We say that expression is a uniform expression if
it is either a globally uniform expression or a locally uniform expression. We say that a uniform expression
is a binary expression if it is guaranteed to take only values in {0, 1}.
Definition 7. An extended n-fold IP is a collection of locally and globally uniform constraints which are
additionally allowed to contain
• inequalities <,≤, >,≥,
• negation (¬) and logical dijcunction ∨ with standard interpretation if applied to binary expressions
and undefined otherwise.
In addition to that we introduce two collections of operations boolm(·), signm(·) for every positive integer m:
boolm(x) =

0, if x = 0,
1, if x 6= 0 and −m ≤ x ≤ m,
undefined, otherwise;
signm(x) =

0, if x = 0,
1, if 1 ≤ x ≤ m,
−1, if −m ≤ x ≤ −1,
undefined, otherwise .
Note that the constraints are still required to be uniform. An extended n-fold IP is valid if the result of all
of its constraints are defined (i.e. no expression used during the construction results in undefined). The two
important parameters of a valid extended n-fold IP are
extended width is the number of inequalities, logical operations, boolm(·), and signm(·) operations (count-
ing them only once for all n locally uniform constraints or expressions); and
height is the maximum m occurring in any of its boolm and signm operations.
The notion of height applies naturally also to expressions and constraints: the height of an expression is
the maximum m appearing in any boolm or signm operation contained in it, and the height of a constraint is
the height of the expression on the left hand side. Observe that if boolm(e) is defined for a given expression
e (i.e., −m ≤ e ≤ m), then boolm+1 is defined. Thus, we may actually require all parameters m in the above
definition to be the same value.
Observation 8. Locally uniform constraints can be of the form x 6=m y.
Proof. The expression x 6=m y is in fact a shorthand for boolm(x− y) = 1.
Observation 9 (Folklore; see e.g. [18]). It is possible to use all logical connectives (i.e., {∧, . . .}) with binary
expressions in an extended n-fold IP.
9
The following theorem deals with how many auxiliary variables and constraints are needed to convert an
extended n-fold IP into standard form.
Theorem 10. Let I be a valid extended n-fold IP with nt variables, r globally uniform constraints, s
locally uniform constraints, largest absolute coefficient value a, extended width w and height M . There is
an algorithm that, given I, in time O(ntw(r + s)) constructs a standard n-fold IP I ′ with nt′ variables, r′
globally uniform constraints, s′ locally uniform constraints and largest absolute coefficient value a′ such that
• t′ = t+O(w),
• r′ = r,
• s′ = s+O(w), and,
• a′ = max(a,M).
Thus, I can be solved in time (a′)ω ·n3L with ω = O((t+w)(s+w)r+ (t+w)2(s+w)) and L = 〈w,b, l,u〉.
An example of an extended n-fold IP We want m variables x1, . . . , xm in each brick describing a
permutation of {1, . . . ,m}. That is equivalent to imposing ∑mj=1 xj = (m+12 ), and xj 6= xk for all j 6= k, and
xj ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for all j. Note that in order to use a non-equality constraint “e 6= f” we need to determine
the largest possible difference |e|−|f |. In this case it is m, and thus we express the aforementioned conditions
by the following 1 +
(
m
2
)
locally uniform constraints:
m∑
j=1
xj =
(
m+ 1
2
)
(2)
xj 6=m xk for all j 6= k, j ∈ [m]. (3)
Further, given n permutations oi1, . . . , o
i
m for i = 1, . . . , n, one for each brick. Now we want to compare
the i-th brick permutation xi1, . . . x
i
m to o
i
1, . . . , o
i
m and determine which indices are inverted, that is, xj < xk
if and only if oj > ok. In other words, we want to determine when the sign of (x
i
j − xik) equals the sign of
(oik − oij). So, for each j 6= k we add a new binary indicator variable sjk as follows:
sjk = bool2
(
signm
(
xij − xik
)
= signm
(
oik − oij
))
. (4)
Notice that signm(o
i
k−oij) is a constant oikj , so (4) turns to bool2
(
signm(x
i
j − xik)− oikj
)
; this is now clearly
a locally uniform expression.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof of Theorem 10. We will prove Theorem 10 by exhaustively applying a set of rewriting rules. These
rewriting rules are applied to expressions or constraints containing logical operations, the boolm(·) or signm(·)
operations, or inequalities. For simplicity, we will use the letters e, f and g for expressions as if they were
single variables, and analogously e♥f with♥ ∈ {<,≤, >,≥} for constraints. This is without loss of generality,
as we always create an auxiliary variable xe and assign an expression e to it by adding an auxiliary constraint
xe = e; similarly for constraints. A rewriting rule can be applied anytime it operands are already represented
by such an variable.
To determine the parameters r′, s′, and t′ of the resulting n-fold IP in standard form, we consider the
“s-increase” ∆s(e) of an expression e, which is the number of auxiliary equalities required to rewrite e into
the standard form. Similarly, the “t-increase” ∆t(e) of e is the number of auxiliary variables needed to
express e, and analogously for globally uniform constraints and ∆r(e). We note the s- and t-increase of each
rule after defining it.
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Rewriting a locally uniform expression e to the standard format. Rewriting a locally uniform
expression e in some locally uniform constraint means replacing it with a new variable z and adding auxiliary
locally uniform constraints. These constraints assure that the variable z will carry the desired meaning. The
result is that every expression e is rewritten to the standard format. In this phase we may still be adding
constraints that are not in the standard format (contain inequalities etc.) as they will be dealt with by
subsequent applications of the rewriting rules.
• e ::= f ∨ g ⇒ create a new binary variable s and set 2xe = xf + xg + se.
Then ∆s(e) = ∆s(f) + ∆s(g) + 1, ∆t(e) = ∆t(f) + ∆t(g) + 2.
• e ::= ¬f ⇒ xz = 1− xf .
Then ∆s(e) = ∆s(f) + 1, ∆t(e) = ∆t(f) + 1.
• e ::= boolm(f) and e ::= signm(f): We have that −L < f < U for L,U ∈ N and m ≤ max{L,U}, since
I is valid. The subscript m in boolm(e) signifies that we need to introduce coefficients (upperbounded
by m) into the (new) system. Let ve, ue ∈ {0, 1} be two new binary variables such that ve = 1 if and
only if xf ≥ 0, and ue = 1 if and only if xf ≤ 0:
1 + xf ≤ Uve ≤ U + xf
1− xf ≤ Lue ≤ L− xf
ve, ue ∈ {0, 1}
Now if e ::= boolm(f) we let xz = ¬(ve ∧ ue) and if e ::= signm(f) we let xz = ve − ue.
Then ∆s(e) = ∆(f) +O(1), ∆t(e) = ∆t(f) +O(1) and analogously for e ::= signm(f).
• e ::= boolm(f♥g) ⇒
– ♥ is “=”: xe = ¬boolm(xf − xg)
– ♥ is “>”: xe = boolm(signm(xf − xg) = 1)
– ♥ is “≥”: xe = boolm(xf > xg) ∨ boolm(xf = xg)
And analogously when ♥ is “<” or “≤”.
Then ∆s(e) = ∆s(f) + ∆s(g) + O(1) and ∆t(e) = ∆t(f) + ∆t(g) + O(1), since the overhead of the
used operations is only O(1).
Rewriting a locally uniform constraint e ::= f♥g to standard format.
• when ♥ is “=”: e = f ⇒ xe − xf = 0.
Then ∆s(e = f) = ∆s(e) + ∆s(f) and ∆t(e = f) = ∆t(e) + ∆t(f).
• when ♥ is not “=”, intuitively we want to add a slack variable: e♥f ⇒ xe − xf + se = 0 with
the variable se having an upper bound u
s and a lower bound ls set as follows:
– ls = 0 and us = Qe when ♥ is “≤”,
– ls = 1 and us = Qe when ♥ is “<”,
– ls = −Qe and us = 0 when ♥ is “≥”, and
– ls = −Qe and us = −1 when ♥ is “>”;
where Qe = max{‖l‖∞, ‖u‖∞} · ant stands for a sufficiently large number.
Then, ∆s(e♥f) = ∆s(e) + ∆s(f) and ∆t(e♥f) = ∆t(e) + ∆t(f) + 1.
Rewriting a globally uniform constraint e ::= f♥g to standard format. First, we rewrite any logical
operations and boolm and signm operations in e and f using the same rules as above, that is, by adding
auxiliary variables and locally uniform constraints. Then, what remains is to deal with the inequalities
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♥ ∈ {<,≤, >,≥}. We use slack variables as before, but since we cannot add just one variable without
breaking the n-fold format, we instead add n new variables and “disable” all but one of them using the lower
and upper bounds:
e♥f ⇒ xe − xf +
∑n
i=1 s
i
e♥f = 0 with s
i
e♥f for i = 1, . . . , n being n new variables with lower and
upper bounds li = ui = 0 for 1 < i ≤ n and with
• l1 = 0 and u1 =∞ when ♥ is “≤”,
• l1 = 1 and u1 =∞ when ♥ is “<”,
• l1 = −∞ and u1 = 0 when ♥ is “≥”, and
• l1 = −∞ and u1 = −1 when ♥ is “>”.
Then, ∆t(e♥f) = ∆t(e) + ∆t(f) if ♥ is “=” and ∆t(e♥f) = ∆t(e) + ∆t(f) + 1 otherwise.
It remains to compute the parameters r′, s′, t′ and a′. Let L be the set of locally uniform constraints
and G be the set of globally uniform constraints. Then
• t′ = t+∑e♥f∈L∆t(e♥f) +∑e♥f∈G ∆t(e♥f) = t+O(w),
• s′ = s+∑e♥f∈L∆s(e♥f) = s+O(w),
• r′ = r, since we have merely added slack variables,
• all coefficients are bounded in absolute value by a′ = max{a,M} since we have only introduced new
large coefficients via the boolm and signm operations and those are upper bounded by M .
This concludes the proof of Theorem 10.
3.4 A demonstration of the rewriting process
In this section we demonstrate the proof of Theorem 10 on the constraints (2) and (3).
Refer to Figure 1. The first constraint is already in the standard format. However, for the other
constraints, the rewriting rules are applied. Fix j, k. The resulting standard n-fold IP will contain the
following constraints (for brevity we omit rewriting inequalities by slack variables as this is standard):
w = xj − xk
1 + w ≤ mv ≤ m+ w
1− w ≤ mu ≤ m− w express z¬ bool = ¬(v ∧ u) = ¬v ∨ ¬u
v¬ = 1− v
∧
u¬ = 1− u v, u, s ∈ {0, 1}
2z∨ = v¬ + u¬ + s
z¬ bool = 1− z∨ and set ¬bool(xj − xk) = 0
z¬ bool = 0 .
Remark. Naturally, we ask if the bool() operation can be implemented without introducing a number a
depending on the lower and upper bounds, as a becomes the base of the run time in Theorem 5. One can
show that such dependence is necessary (proof is deferred to Section 5.1):
Lemma 11. Unless FPT = W[1], the bool() operation cannot be expressed in n-fold IP format by introducing
only f(k) new variables and coefficients bounded by f(k), for any computable function f and k = max{r, s, t}.
Moreover, binary n-fold IP is weakly NP-hard even when r = t = 1 and s = 0.
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xj − xkw :=
boolm(xj − xk)zbool := ¬
(
(xj − xk ≤ 0) ∧ (xj − xk ≥ 0)
)≡
1 + w ≤ mv ≤ m+ w
1− w ≤ mu ≤ m− w
0 = u+ v − 2zbool − s
u, v, zbool, s ∈ {0, 1}
xj 6=m xk ¬¬boolm(xj − xk)
¬boolm(xj = xk)
≡
zbool = 1
≡
Figure 1: An illustration of the rewriting process for (3). An edge is between equivalent expressions, while
an arrow is pointing towards the depending expression.
4 Single-Exponential Algorithms for Voting and Bribing
We now establish a formulation of R-Multi-Bribery as an n-fold IP, for various rules R. To this end, we
first describe the part of the IP which is common to all such rules, in Sect. 4.1. Thereafter, in Sect. 4.2 we
add the parts of the formulation which depend on R.
4.1 General Setup
Given an instance (C, V ) of R-Multi-Bribery, we construct an n-fold IP whose variables describe the
situation after bribery actions (swaps, push actions, control changes) were performed. From these variables
we also derive new variables to express the cost function. In the following we always describe the variables
and constraints added per voter, and there is one brick per voter. So fix a voter v ∈ V .
Swaps. We describe the preference order with swaps S applied by variables xvc , c ∈ C with the intended
meaning xvc = rank(c, v)
S . We stress here that the ranking according to values of xvc is the one in the altered
elections. Recall that constraints (2) and (3) enforce that (xv1, . . . , x
v
|C|) is a permutation of C; we add them
to the program.
To express the swaps performed by S, for each pair of candidates c, c′ ∈ C we introduce binary variables
sv{c,c′} so that s
v
{c,c′} = 1 if and only if c and c
′ are swapped. We need an observation that follows from a
result of Elkind et al. [17, Proposition 3.2].
Observation 12. For complete preference orders ,′, the admissible set S of swaps such that ′=S is
uniquely given as the set of pairs (c, c′) for which either c  c′ ∧ c′ ′ c, or c′  c ∧ c ′ c′.
Thus, we only need to set constraint (4) from Sect. 3.4 with ovc = rank(c, v). Further, for each pair
c, c′ ∈ C of candidates we introduce a variable xv(c,c′) which takes value 1 if c Sv c′, and value 0 otherwise.
Push actions. To indicate push actions, we introduce binary variables pv−|C|, . . . , p
v
|C| where p
v
0 = 1 means
no change, pvj = 1 means push action p
v = j. We set the lower and upper bounds to ensure that pvj = 0 for
all j 6∈ {−av, |C|−av}. Finally, we introduce a variable xvα ∈ {1, . . . , |C|} indicating v’s approval count after
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the push action:
|C|∑
j=−|C|
pvj = 1,
xvα = a
v +
|C|∑
j=−|C|
jpvj .
Influence bit. To model certain variants of the problem, such as R-Manipulation, we need an auxiliary
“influence bit”. We introduce a binary variable xι taking value 1 if a swap or a push action is performed,
and value 0 otherwise:
xι = bool|C|2
 ∑
c,c′∈C
sv{c,c′} +
∑
j 6=0
pvj
 .
Control changes. We introduce two binary variables xva, x
v
` such that x
v
a = 1, x
v
` = 0 if voter v is active,
and xva = 0, x
v
` = 1 if voter v latent:
xva + x
v
` = 1 .
We will also frequently use the following variable-splitting trick:
Lemma 13. Let x be an integral variable with lower bound ` and upper bound u and let z be a binary
variable. It is possible to introduce a variable xz, 1 auxiliary variable, and 3 locally uniform constraints of
height at most m = u− ` such that xz = x if z = 1 and xz = 0 if z = 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume x is normalized, that is, ` = 0. If this is not the case, we replace
x with (x˜ + `) in all constraints and set box constraints for x˜ to 0 ≤ x˜ ≤ u − `. Clearly, this substitution
yields an equivalent integer program.
We first, add constrains 0 ≤ xz ≤ uz. Now, if z = 0, then xz = 0 and otherwise (z = 1) we have
` ≤ xz ≤ u. We now essentially repeat this trick with a negation of z for a new variable x¬z, that is, we add
constraints 0 ≤ x¬z ≤ u(1− z). Finally we add the constraint xz + x¬z = x which finishes the construction,
since by the above discussion we know one of the variables xz, x¬z must be set to 0 and thus the other must
be set to the same value as x.
Objective function. Finally, collectively for all voters the linear objective function is given as follows:
w(x, s,p) =
∑
v∈V
 ∑
c,c′∈C
σv(c, c′)sv(c,c′)
+
 |C|∑
j=−|C|
piv(j)pvj
+ ιvxvι + αvxva + δvxv`
 .
Observe that the maximum coefficient of the objective function, i.e., ‖w‖∞, is the maximum of all the cost
functions σv, piv, ιv, αv and δv across all their arguments. So far we have introduced O(|C|2) variables and
imposed O(|C|2) constraints on them (per brick). The largest coefficient introduced in a constraint is |C|,
and we have already used the boolM operation with M = |C|2.
4.2 Voting rules
Now we describe the part specific to the voting rules. A voting rule R is incorporated in the IP in two
steps. First, optionally, new variables are derived using locally uniform constraints. Then, globally uniform
constraints are imposed.
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Often we can only set up the IP knowing certain facts about how the winning condition is satisfied.
We guess those facts, construct the IP, solve it and remember the objective value. Finally, we choose the
minimum over all guesses.
(R1) Scoring protocol s = (s1, . . . , s|C|). We introduce variables τvc for the number of points that voter v
gives candidate c:
τvc =
|C|∑
k=1
sk bool|C|(xvc = k)
Then, an “active” copy τvac of each variable τ
v
c is created such that we can disregard the contribution of
latent voters. To do this we use Lemma 13 with x := τvc , z := x
a, and xz := τvac for every c ∈ C. Then we
add the following globally uniform constraints specifying that the score received by c? is greater than the
score received by any other candidate:∑
v∈V
τvac <
∑
v∈V
τvac? for c ∈ C \ {c?} .
(R2) Any C1 rule R. We guess the resulting <M such that c? is a winner with respect to R; there are
O(3|C|
2
) guesses. From <M we can infer for any pair c, c
′ of distinct candidates, whether v(c, c′) > v(c′, c),
v(c′, c) > v(c, c′) or v(c, c′) = v(c′, c′). With this knowledge, we add the following constraints, where again
variables with an a in the superscript stand for the active parts:∑
v∈V
xva(c,c′) >
∑
v∈V
xva(c′,c) if c <M c
′,∑
v∈V
xva(c,c′) =
∑
v∈V
xva(c′,c) if v(c, c
′) = v(c′, c) .
(R3) Maximin rule. For c? to be winner with the maximin rule means that there is a number B ∈
{0, 1, . . . , |V |} such that v∗(c?) = B, while for all c ∈ C \ {c?}, v∗(c) < B. (Recall that v∗(c) = min{v(c, c′) |
c′ ∈ C \ {c}}.) This implies that for every candidate c 6= c? there is a candidate d(c) (the defeater of c) such
that v(c, d(c)) < B. All in all B and d(c) for every c ∈ C \{c?}, that is, we guess a mapping d : C \{c?} → C;
there are at most n · (|C| − 1)|C| guesses. Then add the following constraints:∑
v∈V
xva(c?,c) ≥ B c ∈ C \ {c?}∑
v∈V
xva(c,d(c)) < B c ∈ C \ {c?} .
(R4) Bucklin. To determine the control action γ, we guess the number |V γa | ∈ {1, . . . , |V |} of active voters
and set ∑
v∈V
xva = |V γa | .
Then, guess the winning round k and note that the winning score will be larger than |V γa |/2. Altogether,
there are O(|C||V |) guesses. Similarly to scoring protocols, we introduce variables τvc (number of points for
candidate c in k-approval) and τ˜vc (number of points for candidate c in (k−1)-approval). Again, we consider
only the active parts τvac of τ
v
c and τ˜
va
c of τ˜
v
c :
τvc = bool|C| (x
v
c < k) c ∈ C
τ˜vc = bool|C| (x
v
c < k − 1) c ∈ C .
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Then, the winning condition is expressed as:∑
v∈V
τvac? > |V γa | /2∑
v∈V
τvac ≤
∑
v∈V
τvac? c ∈ C \ {c?}∑
v∈V
τ˜vac ≤ |V γa | /2 c ∈ C .
(R5) SP-AV. In SP-AV, each candidate c receives a point if it ranks above the approval count. As before,
we introduce variables τvc for points received by a candidate c and split them into active and latent (again
using Lemma 13).
τvc = bool|C|(x
v
c ≤ xvα) c ∈ C∑
v∈V
τvac ≤
∑
v∈V
τvac? c ∈ C \ {c?} .
(R6) Fallback. In the fallback rule, the non-approved candidates are discarded, the Bucklin rule is applied
and if it fails to select a winner, the SP-AV rule is applied. We guess the Bucklin winning round k or if
SP-AV is used and the number |V γa | of active voters; there are O(|V | · |C|) guesses. (SP-AV is used exactly
when the winning score is less than |V γa | /2.) If Bucklin is used, we need a slight modification to take push
actions into account. Instead of τvac = bool|C|(xc < k) we have
τvc = bool|C|(x
v
c < k) ∧ bool|C|(k ≤ xvα) ;
similarly for τ˜vac .
For each of the rules (R1)-(R6), as argued, we have constructed an extended n-fold IP with O(|C|2)
variables and locally uniform constraints per brick, and O(|C|2) globally uniform constraints. The largest
coefficient is |C|, the height is O(|C|2) and the extended width is also O(|C|2). Thus, by Theorem 10 we can
compute an n-fold matrix with parameters r = s = t = a = O(|C|2). Proposition 5 is then used to solve this
n-fold IP in time 2O(|C|
6 log |C|)n3〈w〉. Also, O(3|C|2) guesses suffice for each rule except Maximin, Bucklin,
and Fallback, where O(|C|2|V |) guesses suffice.
An exception to this run time is the Kemeny rule:
(R7) Kemeny. For c? to be a Kemeny winner, there has to be a ranking R∗ of the candidates that
ranks c? first and maximizes the total agreement with voters∑
v∈V
∣∣{(c, c′) ∈ C × C | ((c R∗ c′)⇔ (c v c′))}∣∣
among all rankings. In other words, the number of swaps sufficient to transform all i into R∗ is smaller
than the number of swaps needed to transform all v into any other R′ where c? is not first.
We guess the ranking R∗ over all rankings of C; then we introduce variables xvR for R ∈ {R∗} ∪ {R′ |
c? is not first in R′} so that xvR is the number of swaps needed to transform Sv into R (recall that S is
the bribery described by the variables xvc ). We again split variables x
v
R and in the score comparison consider
their active parts xavR only. Then, we introduce the necessary constraints:
xvR =
∑
c,c′∈C,c 6=c′
bool2
(
sign|C|(x
v
c − xvc′) = sign|C|(rank(c′, R)− rank(c,R)
)
for all R,
∑
v∈V
xavR >
∑
v∈V
xavR∗ , R 6= R∗ .
This solves Kemeny-Multi-Bribery in time |C|O(|C|!6)n3, and completes proving Theorem 1.
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5 Lower Bounds and Hardness for n-fold IPs
Here we provide the proof of Lemma 11 which shows that the bool() operation cannot be implemented in
n-fold IPs without introducing large numbers into the system and that solving n-fold IPs becomes W[1]-hard
when parameterized only by (r, s, t).
5.1 bool() inexpressibility: Unary Bin Packing
The Unary Bin Packing problem takes as input n items of integer sizes o1, . . . , on as well as two integers
k,B, and asks if the items can be packed into k bins each of which has capacity B. Here by packing we
mean an assignment of items to bins σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , k} such that the packing is admissible, that is,∑
i∈σ−1(j) oi ≤ B for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Unary Bin Packing Parameter: k
Input: Positive integers k,B encoded in unary and item sizes o1, . . . , on for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Task: Find an admissible packing of the items to k bins.
Jansen et al. [29] prove that this problem is W[1]-hard parameterized by k.
Lemma 14. Unless FPT = W[1], the bool() operation cannot be expressed in n-fold IP format by introducing
only f(k) new variables and numbers bounded by f(k), for any computable function f and k = max{r, s, t}.
Proof. Given an instance (o1, . . . , on, k, B) of Unary Bin Packing, we create an n-fold IP as follows. We
create a brick for each item oi, and introduce k variables x
i
1, . . . , x
i
k for i = 1, . . . , n and the following locally
uniform constraints:
k∑
j=1
xij = oi, (AssignItem)
k∑
j=1
booln(x
i
j) = 1 . (OneBin)
Clearly (AssignItem) and (OneBin) together forces xij = oi for exactly one j, which we then denote j(i),
and xij′ = 0 for all j
′ 6= j(i). Intuitively, this means that an item i belongs to the bin j(i). Using globally
uniform constraints we enforce that no bin overflows:∑
i
xij ≤ B, j = 1, . . . , k .
It is clear that this IP is feasible if and only if (o1, . . . , on, k, B) is a “yes” instance.
Now suppose it is possible to express the booln(·) using f(k) additional local variables and f(k) locally
uniform constraints all of which use numbers bounded by f(k) in absolute value. Replacing the condition
(OneBin) with this expression and invoking Theorem 10 on the thus altered IP model we obtain an n-fold
IP with r, s, t, A = f(k). Finally, this would yield an f ′(k)nO(1)BO(1)-time algorithm for the Unary Bin
Packing problem, where f ′ is a computable function independent of n. Consequently, FPT=W[1].
5.2 Largest Coefficient Matters: Subset Sum
The Subset Sum problem is a well known (weakly) NP-hard problem and is defined as follows. Given
n positive integers w1, . . . , wn and the target value T the task is to find a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that∑
i∈I wi = T .
Lemma 15. Binary n-fold IP is weakly NP-hard even when r = t = 1 and s = 0.
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Proof. We formulate the Subset Sum problem straightforwardly as an n-fold IP with n bricks a exactly one
global condition: ∑
i∈{1,...,n}
wix
i
1 = T , (5)
where xi1 ∈ {0, 1} are binary variables. Observe that the parameters of the above n-fold IP are r = t = 1
and s = 0.
Proof of Lemma 11. The lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 14 and Lemma 15.
6 Conclusions and open problems
We introduced a general voting and bribing problem, R-Multi-Bribery, which allows for swaps, push
actions, and control changes. For several classical voting rules R, we provided formulations of R-Multi-
Bribery in terms of n-fold integer programs; those formulations lead
• to the first fixed-parameter algorithms for some of those problems and
• to the first single-exponential algorithms for others.
Our approach is also natural in handling situations where each voter has different pricing functions, which
was previously not possible in most cases. In particular, we provide the first fixed-parameter algorithm for
R-Swap Bribery with arbitrary cost functions, for many natural voting rules R.
While our result covers many classical and well-studied voting rules, we are convinced that many other
rules are covered by our framework. What would be highly desirable though is to obtain sufficient con-
ditions on easy-to-check properties of rules R for which R-Multi-Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable
parameterized by the number of candidates, or for which it admits a single-exponential time algorithm.
It would also be desirable to complement our algorithmic upper bounds with matching lower bounds
based on the Exponential Time Hypothesis, by either improving the run times of the provided algorithms
or providing appropriate hardness results.
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A Problem Definitions
We provide the formal definitions of the voting and bribing problems covered by our result for R-Multi-
Bribery. In these definitions, for each problem R-Problem, by “such that c? wins the election” we mean
that c? wins the election under voting rule R.
The R-$Bribery problem was introduced by Faliszewski et al. [20], and further studied by Bredereck et
al. [10]:
R-$Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: A complete election (C, V ), a designated candidate c? ∈ C, and a price vector (pv)v∈V .
Task: Select a subset S ⊆ V minimizing ∑v∈S pv such that changing their preference orders v, v ∈ S
arbitrarily to preference orders ′v makes c? win the election
(
C, (′v)v∈S ∪ (v)v∈V \S
)
.
TheR-Manipulation problem was introduced by Faliszewski et al. [24], who studied it for the Copelandα
rule:
R-Manipulation Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ), a designated candidate c? ∈ C, a set M ⊆ V of manipulators whose
preference lists are empty (all candidates tied) and complete preferences for all V \M .
Task: Determine complete preference orders ′v for all voters v ∈ M such that c? wins the election
(C, (′v)v∈M ∪ (v)v∈V \M ).
The R-Swap Bribery problem was introduced by Elkind et al. [17]:
R-Swap Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: A complete election (C, V ), a designated candidate c? ∈ C, and swap cost functions σv for v ∈ V .
Task: Find a set S of admissible swaps with minimum cost such that c? wins the election (C, V )S .
R-Shift Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ), a designated candidate c? ∈ C, and swap cost functions σv for v ∈ V .
Task: Find a set S of admissable shifts of smallest cost such that c? wins the election (C, V )S .
R-Support Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ) with approval counts av for v ∈ V , a designated candidate c? ∈ C, and push
action cost functions piv for v ∈ V .
Task: Find a set P of push actions with minimum cost such that c? wins the election (C, V )P .
R-Mixed Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ) with approval counts av for v ∈ V , a designated candidate c? ∈ C, swap cost
functions σv for v ∈ V and push action cost functions piv for v ∈ V .
Task: Find a set S of admissible swaps and a set P of push actions with minimum cost such that c?
wins the election ((C, V )S)P .
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R-Extension Bribery Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ) with approval counts av for v ∈ V and av-top-truncated preference orders,
and push action cost functions piv for v ∈ V .
Task: Extend the approved part of each voter by kv ∈ N previously disapproved candidates such that
c? becomes the winner, minimizing
∑
v∈V cv(kv).
R-Possible Winner Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ) and a designated candidate c? ∈ C.
Task: Decide if the partial orders ≺v, v ∈ V can be extended to linear orders ≺′v such that c? wins the
election (C, {≺v}v∈V ).
R-CCAV/CCDV Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V = Va unionmulti V`), a designated candidate c? ∈ C, activation costs αv for v ∈ V` and
deactivation costs δv for v ∈ Va.
Task: Find a set of voter (de)activations with minimum cost so that c? wins the perturbed election.
Dodgson Score Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ) and a designated candidate c? ∈ C.
Task: Find a smallest set S of admissable swaps such that c? becomes the Condorcet winner of the
election (C, V )S .
Young Score Parameter: |C|
Input: An election (C, V ) and a designated candidate c? ∈ C.
Task: Find a smallest set S ⊆ V of voters that need to be removed such that c? becomes the Condorcet
winner of the election (C, V \ S).
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